On this episode of "Intelligence Issues," host Michael Morell speaks with Peter Wittig, Germany's former ambassador to america, United Kingdom, Lebanon, Cyprus and the United Nations, about overseas perceptions of america at pivotal historic moments. Wittig and Morell hint the evolution of America's standing within the eyes of the world from the tip of the World Wars to the tip of the Chilly Warfare, by the interval following 9/11, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to right this moment. Wittig affords insights on the impact of the Trump administration's "America First" coverage on international alliances and shares his view on the Biden administration's effort to rally international assist for Ukraine earlier than and through Russia's invasion. Wittig and Morell additionally focus on how its home instability might undermine America's credibility and talent to steer.
Highlights:
- China's relationship with Russia: "[I]n my private view, China has dedicated a colossal error in promising Putin a 'friendship with no limits,' because it was referred to as, when the 2 leaders met. I assume now many prime Chinese language officers are already regretting it, they usually should have been shocked by Russia's surprisingly poor army struggle efficiency. However my evaluation is that Beijing might be very cautious to not be dragged into the Russian imbroglio and and be very cautious to keep away from U.S. and European sanctions. And which means, I assume, China will neither select to be an unconditional ally with Russia, nor will it abandon Russia as an vital junior companion for China."
- The best way ahead in Ukraine: "This might be a protracted battle in a type of struggle of attrition. Who may have the higher hand in such a struggle if the struggle disappears from web page considered one of Western media? Putin is a ruthless chief. He is not going to settle for defeat. So clearly NATO nations must step up their assist to assist Ukraine in pushing again the aggression. However in some unspecified time in the future, the Ukrainians must determine what their struggle targets are. This can be a, at the start, in fact, Ukrainian resolution. But in addition NATO must replicate on the circumstances of a potential stop fireplace and past. We're not at this level but, however there might be troublesome decisions forward."
- Home instability within the U.S.: "I worry that ... U.S. mushy energy is fading. Allies fear in regards to the subsequent U.S. presidential election. Will the dropping candidate and his or her celebration as soon as once more declare that the victory was stolen? Our authoritarian foes on the earth are gleefully watching the fragility of a strong democracy. So excessive home polarization and political gridlock in a rustic weakens the facility overseas and weakens the power to steer internationally. And I believe that is the primary problem of the U.S. right this moment."
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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - PETER WITTIG
PRODUCER: OLIVIA GAZIS
MICHAEL MORELL: Ambassador Wittig, Peter, welcome to Intelligence Issues. Thanks a lot for becoming a member of us this morning.
PETER WITTIG: Thanks, Michael, for having me in your program.
MICHAEL MORELL: So, Peter, you already know that I have been wanting for a while to have a dialogue on Intelligence Issues about overseas perceptions of america. And fairly frankly, I can not consider anybody higher positioned than you to have that dialog with - your time in Washington, your time in London, your time in New York, all of your contacts all over the world offer you, I believe, extra perception into this query than actually anyone else I can consider. You clearly have your personal perceptions, in fact, however you even have, I am positive, gotten an excellent sense of the perceptions of many people all over the world as properly.
I additionally need to simply begin by saying that that I hope we are able to speak about overseas authorities perceptions of america, not essentially public perceptions. However if you wish to carry public perceptions into the dialogue, please do. Let's simply clarify that we're making that acutely aware swap from public to authorities and forwards and backwards.
Peter, I believe one of the best place to start out is to speak about why overseas perceptions of america matter. Why ought to Individuals care? Why ought to my listeners care? I can think about some folks saying, you already know, who cares? Some Individuals saying, 'Who cares what others on the earth consider us?'
So how would you reply that query by way of why do overseas perceptions of the U.S. matter?
PETER WITTIG: Michael, I've two ideas in your query. The primary is considered one of an expert diplomat. Perceptions of different nations matter loads as a result of perceptions affect, typically even decide, overseas coverage decisions. Whether or not overseas governments contemplate the U.S. as an or disinterested celebration, as robust or weak, as united or divided on sure worldwide points. These perceptions form their nations' choices.
And the good historian Christopher Clark has argued in his well-known guide on the First World Warfare, it is referred to as "The Sleepwalkers," that the struggle broke out not less than partly due to the gorgeous misperceptions that the foremost powers had over one another.
So my second thought is one which I've as an awesome buddy of america. It's about alliances. It is true the U.S. remains to be probably the most highly effective nation on the earth, however even the U.S. wants allies to realize its targets in overseas and safety coverage. In different phrases, alliances are a part of the U.S. energy projection on the earth. What distinguishes the U.S. from different nice powers like China or Russia is its capability to create and keep voluntary alliances on an equal footing primarily based on shared values and and respect for one another, not primarily based on coercion or financial dependency, and to have the ability to do this. Overseas perceptions of the U.S. matter enormously.
MICHAEL MORELL: So, Peter, let's discuss slightly bit about how and why perceptions of the U.S. have modified during the last a number of many years. You, Peter, joined the German diplomatic service in the course of the Chilly Warfare, simply as I joined CIA in the course of the Chilly Warfare. How was America perceived by the world then, and why in the course of the Chilly Warfare?
PETER WITTIG: Effectively, when the Second World Warfare ended and the Chilly Warfare began, the U.S. took a seminal, enormously consequential resolution. So in stark distinction to the aftermath of the First World Warfare, this time the U.S. didn't go away Europe. It remained engaged in Europe - and in Japan, by the best way. So past army forces on the bottom, it engaged economically on a big scale: the Marshall Plan or the financial restoration program transferred over 13 billion U.S. dollars, equal to 120 billion right this moment, to Western Europe to rebuild war-torn areas and enhance prosperity.
In fact, it was not only a charitable reward. It was an extremely farsighted funding to safe geopolitical affect over Western Europe and forestall the unfold of communism. However it additionally formed Europe's and in notably Germany's notion of the U.S. as a power for good. It occurred, think about, 75 years in the past and remains to be a part of our collective reminiscence.
The creation of NATO in in 1949 and later the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact had been expressions of the Chilly Warfare division of Europe. In fact, the notion of the U.S. at the moment trusted the camp to which these nations belonged. For Germany and different nations in Western Europe, nature was the army and political reassurance that assured their existence. Germany, as an illustration, was a frontline state. Later, the Vietnam Warfare divided European societies as a lot because it divided the general public opinion within the U.S.
However on a governmental degree, the transatlantic alliance was by no means jeopardized. And the identical goes for the arms build-up in Europe within the seventies. The governments knew full properly that with out the safety of the U.S. they might be uncovered to Soviet coercion. So the notion of the U.S. as a protecting energy, as it's a European polity, if you'll, with pores and skin within the recreation, was essential to the peace and prosperity of Europe. And by the best way, a lot of the identical optimistic improvement occurred with the opposite main World Warfare II foe of the U.S., specifically Japan.
MICHAEL MORELL: So, Peter, discuss slightly bit about that interval between the autumn of the Berlin Wall, the autumn of the Soviet Union at one finish of the timeline, and 9/11 on the opposite finish of the timeline. That is the so-called unipolar second for the U.S.: How did governments all over the world understand america then and why?
PETER WITTIG: Effectively. Enable me for a second to dwell on the autumn of the wall in Germany in 1989, please. As a result of that was the second when the notion of the U.S. as a trusting ally and a power for good was at its peak. The Bush-Baker staff on the time acknowledged early on that the unification of the 2 Germanies was merely unstoppable. So the U.S. supported it wholeheartedly as an alternative of resisting it. And that was the primary intuition, understandably, in a manner, of France and Britain. The U.S. administration tried to steer the inevitable in the correct path, embedding the united Germany firmly within the Western fold.
I personally contemplate this a U.S. masterpiece of skillful and strategically visionary diplomacy. And greater than that, it instilled a way of huge gratitude to the U.S. in a era of German political leaders.
To your query on the unipolar second, certainly. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 - one other actually pivotal historic second - the clear notion was there's just one superpower left. The tip of historical past. It was not solely the title of an influential guide by Francis Fukuyama, but it surely was additionally principally the mindset of many leaders in Europe. The U.S. was seen because the uncontested democratic chief of the world, particularly by the brand new democracies.
The idea being that, ultimately, most nations of the world would observe the, if I'll say so, liberal Democratic script of the West. It did not occur. All of us, we underestimated the power of what we thought of archaic forces within the worldwide enviornment: extremist nationalism, violent non secular radicalism, ethnic tribal forces of all types. They examined us, all of us, beginning within the Nineties and originally of the brand new century. So it was clearly not the tip of historical past.
MICHAEL MORELL: Peter, we'll discuss intimately in slightly bit about Ukraine, however I need to ask you right here, in the event you imagine that america and NATO made a mistake throughout this unipolar second by increasing NATO to the east, by increasing it proper to the Russian border. I'm wondering what your ideas are on that query.
There's a variety of dialogue about that right this moment. Would right this moment be totally different if we had taken a special course with post-Soviet Russia? Would we be higher off or would we be worse off? What are your ideas on that query?
PETER WITTIG: Michael, you are proper. The debates about who misplaced Russia have been rekindled with the Russian struggle towards Ukraine on February 24. I need to weigh my judgment very fastidiously right here.
George Kennan, a towering determine of generations of diplomats referred to as the swift NATO growth probably the most fateful period of American coverage within the post-Chilly Warfare period. I believe Henry Kissinger argues alongside comparable strains. Even William Burns, the present CIA director and former ambassador to Russia, whom I deeply revered and I had the pleasure to work with him in Washington, even Burns referred to as the NATO growth within the mid-nineties, 'untimely at finest, and needlessly provocative for Russia at worst.'
I might partially disagree right here. The brand new Jap European states - Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, additionally the Baltic states - they had been present process a tremendously difficult and troublesome transformation course of and with post-communist forces very a lot alive and their democratic success removed from assured. These nations needed to get out of a safety grey zone as quick as potential, and with NATO membership, locked of their success as Western model democracies and prevented a type of a backsliding right into a safety and political no man's land.
And in addition to the NATO-Russia settlement of 1997 that adopted the invitation for Jap European nations to affix, it was de facto a recognition of this new actuality by Russia. So I actually do not buy Putin's narrative right this moment that directs Russia's struggle towards Ukraine again to NATO's growth to Jap Europe, as if this was type of the unique sin. By no means has NATO, a protection alliance, threatened Russia, in its territorial integrity or sovereignty.
And Russia, in flip, has signed varied worldwide agreements the place the correct of states to decide on their very own alliances freely had been enshrined, just like the Constitution of Paris in 1919. So Putin's justification of his invasion of Ukraine as a defensive act towards an aggressive NATO is solely absurd and solely serves to cowl up his, one good name [it], 'revisionist venture' to reinstate Russia's dominance over Jap Europe.
MICHAEL MORELL: Peter, discuss slightly bit in regards to the perceptions of america after 9/11. In order that's the following large geopolitical second right here, proper. And the perceptions of the U.S. dealing with of that struggle towards terrorism.
You speak about drone strikes. You'll be able to speak about torture. You talked in regards to the Iraq struggle, the lengthy struggle in Afghanistan. After which you've the monetary disaster. You might have a failure to implement the said crimson line in Syria. You might have the rise of populism in america.
In brief, take us from 9/11 to only earlier than the invasion of Ukraine, and the way perceptions of the U.S. developed throughout that interval. And I do know that is a giant query.
PETER WITTIG: Sure, Michael. These are a variety of questions. And these are all groundbreaking occasions, however of a really totally different nature.
9/11 was perceived as an assault not simply towards the U.S., however towards the entire Western alliance. Bear in mind, NATO invoked Article 5 of its treaty, the case of collective protection, for the primary time in its historical past, solely in the future after 9/11. And this was an act of unprecedented solidarity.
The struggle towards the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which had hosted and guarded Al-Qaeda, was seen as a authentic protection act. It was fairly totally different within the case of the Iraq struggle in 2003, versus Bush father's struggle towards Iraq in 1991 to liberate Kuwait. Bush's son didn't get a mandate from the U.N. Safety Council.
Europe was cut up into two camps: France and Germany opposed Bush's resolution to go to struggle towards Iraq. The U.Ok. and a few Jap European nations supported the US. However it left scars within the allies. The controversy was in regards to the legitimacy of the Iraq struggle, but additionally in regards to the results of army interventions within the Center East. In hindsight, the Iraq struggle turned out to be a catastrophe for the area.
MICHAEL MORELL: Sure, positive.
PETER WITTIG: And Iran was the winner of this geopolitical earthquake. You talked about, you already know, Abu Ghraib and the torture practices. That alienated many nations and tarnished the picture of the U.S. as a standard-bearer of human rights.
However the Iraq struggle additionally taught us all a lesson in regards to the limits of Western interventions in overseas areas. And that was, I assume, the backdrop of Obama's resolution to not implement the beforehand said crimson strains in Syria.
After lengthy wars in Afghanistan and Iraq with restricted success, the American folks had been struggle weary, and I believe European leaders understood that. I believe they had been much less vital of this U.S. retrenchment from the worldwide scene or from components of the world than the U.S. political class or the assume tanks in Washington.
Michael, you talked about the rise of populism within the U.S. That is a completely totally different matter. President Trump's "America First" Doctrine and his at occasions outright disdain for alliances got here as a shock to European leaders. In fact, with notable exceptions, just like the Hungarian strongman Orban or Boris Johnson, who flirted with Trump.
Politically talking, Trump's actions had been seen as an actual menace to the survival of NATO and the Western allies. Europeans feared President Trump would merely abdicate from the U.S. position as chief of the Western neighborhood of countries. Fortunately, it didn't occur. In a manner, the Trump presidency was a wholesome wake-up name to Europeans and to Germans particularly to take a position extra for their very own safety and cease free driving in protection spending.
However I have to additionally add a qualifying comment right here. On a world scale, there have been fairly a couple of governments and leaders that noticed in Trump and in his America First strategy welcome change or perhaps a mannequin to emulate. From Brazil to the Philippines, from Israel to Saudi Arabia. So Trump was definitely not alone.
MICHAEL MORELL: So Peter, did the US distancing itself from its allies, did it power these allies in any approach to hedge a bit with regard to Russia and China, do you assume, or not?
PETER WITTIG: The notion of the U.S. shifted in keeping with occasions. The assumptions of leaders had been in all probability extra secure than these of the quite fickle public opinions within the case of Europe. Belief of allies had developed over many years of closed cooperation and was not simply destroyed.
The Iraq struggle, nevertheless, put a pressure on this degree of belief. However there was by no means any query of hedging their bets by relying extra on China and Russia.
The Trump presidency, nevertheless, was, as I mentioned, an occasion of a special nature. His administration was at occasions - regarding our continent - was at occasions outrightly hostile to the European Union. He as soon as referred to as it worse than China, so most European leaders rapidly realised Europe should rely extra on itself.
And another vital factor. The perceived absence of the U.S. management within the West in the course of the time of Trump created a vacuum. Russia and China tried to step in and fill the hole in Europe, but additionally Latin America, Asia and the Center East.
MICHAEL MORELL: So, Peter, let's shift gears right here and speak about Ukraine. And let me begin right here with a really basic query: has the U.S. response to the preliminary build-up of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border after which the U.S. response to the invasion itself, altered perceptions of the U.S.? And in that case, by how a lot? What's your sense of that?
PETER WITTIG: The U.S. was the primary one to see by the build-up of Russian forces on the Ukrainian border and to foretell an outright Russian struggle of aggression. And the groundbreaking step to share its intelligence not solely with governments, but additionally with the general public at massive, was a primary - had by no means been achieved earlier than on this scale.
So that is, if I'll say so, this coercive use of intelligence destroyed Putin's narratives and pretexts for his struggle. Nonetheless, few governments in Europe, one has to admit, had believed the U.S. forecasts, together with, by the best way, the Ukrainian management.
However the U.S. intelligence turned out to be precisely proper. As much as this precise day of of the invasion. So the administration's clairvoyance and the dealing with of the struggle - resolute however managed and measured, strengthened its fame and the belief in US management. And it stood in stark distinction to the chaotic manner the U.S. engagement in Afghanistan was ended.
However I additionally should add a caveat right here. Europe's perspective just isn't consultant of the entire world. Solely 58 nations, primarily the European and Asian allies, participate within the sanctions regime towards Russia. Many vital nations even refuse to sentence Russia's struggle of aggression. Not solely China, however many heavyweights from the worldwide south India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, the Gulf nations. On this sense, the world is way from united in its notion of the U.S. and its allies.
MICHAEL MORELL: So I am questioning, Peter, what's behind the reluctance of so many nations on the earth to sentence Putin's invasion of Ukraine and to assist the West and the Ukrainians?
You talked about India and Brazil and Mexico. Why have they taken the place they've taken?
PETER WITTIG: I believe they've totally different motivations. A few of these nations are closely depending on arms deliveries or power provide from Russia. And others simply do not assume that the Ukraine struggle or the battle in Ukraine is related for them of their eyes; it is a distant European factor.
And others simply do not need to belong to the Western camp. They need to keep out of that battle and be impartial. They assume it will likely be to their detriment in the event that they be part of the Western camp. So their motivations are manifold and totally different for every of these nations who haven't joined us in resisting Russia's aggression.
MICHAEL MORELL: Peter, I'll ask a broader query to you in a minute about China. However at this level, let me simply ask, to what extent has China's assist for Russia's invasion of Ukraine broken the EU's relationship with China - which is a critically vital relationship for each China and the EU. Do you've a way of that?
PETER WITTIG: Effectively, sure. China's response to Russia's invasion has certainly vital repercussions in Europe. Europeans started to shine a way more vital mild on China as these two authoritarian regimes have shaped an alliance.
Firms doing enterprise with China are going through rising headwinds from their home public opinions in Europe, but additionally from their governments. Now the European Union might be extra outspoken and demanding on China-related points like Taiwan, on the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, or Hong Kong.
And for my part, in my private view, China has dedicated a colossal error in promising Putin a 'friendship with no limits,' because it was referred to as, when the 2 leaders met. I assume now many prime Chinese language officers are already regretting it, they usually should have been shocked by Russia's surprisingly poor army struggle efficiency.
However my evaluation is that Beijing might be very cautious to not be dragged into the Russian imbroglio and and be very cautious to keep away from U.S. and European sanctions. And which means, I assume, China will neither select to be an unconditional ally with Russia, nor will it abandon Russia as an vital junior companion for China.
MICHAEL MORELL: Peter, as you take a look at Ukraine right this moment, what considerations you most in regards to the struggle there? And on condition that concern, given how you consider it in the meanwhile, what do you assume we, outlined as NATO, must do going ahead right here?
PETER WITTIG: Michael, my concern is that wih all of the admirable, heroic bravery of the Ukrainian armed forces and the weapons flowing in from Western nations, Russia is making beneficial properties within the Donbas within the jap a part of Ukraine, primarily due to its relentless artillery assaults. So we might be in for a for much longer haul, I imagine, months, perhaps taking us properly into the following 12 months.
This might be a protracted battle in a type of struggle of attrition. Who may have the higher hand in such a struggle if the struggle disappears from web page considered one of Western media? Putin is a ruthless chief. He is not going to settle for defeat. So clearly NATO nations must step up their assist to assist Ukraine in pushing again the aggression.
However in some unspecified time in the future, the Ukrainians must determine what their struggle targets are. This can be a, at the start, in fact, Ukrainian resolution. But in addition NATO must replicate on the circumstances of a potential stop fireplace and past. We're not at this level but, however there might be troublesome decisions forward.
MICHAEL MORELL: Peter, as you consider the place this is likely to be headed - and I do know it is a powerful query - however at this level, what do you assume the end result will in the end be? And I do know which may depend upon coverage choices made in a variety of locations, however what's your expectation for a way this ends?
PETER WITTIG:.Michael, a troublesome query certainly. It is troublesome to inform. I are inclined to assume that on the battlefield, in the long run, neither facet will be capable to declare outright victory. However how does this alteration the world round Russia? Putin's Russia has began a brutal struggle of aggression towards a sovereign nation and has dedicated struggle crimes. It's liable for tens of hundreds of useless and wounded, of unbelievable destruction of cities, infrastructure and cultural heritage, not forgetting the various million refugees and an unfathomable struggling of the inhabitants - that would be the Russian legacy.
So Russia will go away a wound in Europe's jap half that can take generations to heal. Russia has additionally destroyed the post-Chilly Warfare order. It is already historical past. We see, I imagine, a Chilly Warfare 2.0 rising in Europe. Western and allied nations will have interaction in some kind of containment technique, a brand new enhanced army buildup, long run financial sanctions, political isolation of Russia so long as Putin's regime stays in energy. So Putin actually has already misplaced the struggle.
NATO has been reinvigorated; even historically impartial nations like Finland and Sweden at the moment are becoming a member of. Unimaginable some time in the past. The EU confirmed stunning unity and can beef up its protection. And the medium and long run results of the sanctions regime - by the best way, probably the most strong in historical past towards any main nation - will cripple the Russian financial system and drive proficient younger Russians in a foreign country.
Putin will need to tighten the grip in his speedy neighbourhood by an alliance of authoritarian regimes. That is a part of his imperial venture to resuscitate Russia's imagined glory of the previous. Michael, I believe it is not going to finish properly for Russia.
MICHAEL MORELL: Peter, I need to ask you two ultimate questions right here. As you consider the altering perceptions of america during the last a number of many years, are there any broad classes, broad themes that leap out to you?
PETER WITTIG: Okay. Effectively, Michael, my ultimate thought revolves across the U.S. home state of affairs. It issues enormously for the best way the U.S. is perceived on the earth. Any buddy of the U.S. have to be deeply involved in regards to the degree of division and bitter polarization in in America's political and public life. For a lot of younger democracies across the globe, the U.S. because the oldest constitutional democracy on the earth, served as a mannequin.
Germany was a kind of nations. I worry that this instance and this type of, if I'll say so, U.S. mushy energy, is fading. Allies fear in regards to the subsequent U.S. presidential election. Will the dropping candidate and his or her celebration as soon as once more declare that the victory was stolen? Our authoritarian foes on the earth are gleefully watching the fragility of a strong democracy. So excessive home polarization and political gridlock in a rustic weakens the facility overseas and weakens the power to steer internationally. And I believe that is the primary problem of the U.S. right this moment.
MICHAEL MORELL: I could not agree extra with that, Peter.
Final query, Peter. Clearly, the connection between america and China is vital for the entire world, and the way that relationship evolves might be vital to the world. For those who might advise each america and China about learn how to handle that relationship going ahead, what would your broad ideas be?
PETER WITTIG: Michael, I imagine China is on the best way to grow to be a one-man autocracy. President Xi Jinping might be given a 3rd time period on the celebration convention on the finish of the 12 months. It's doubtless that he plans to remain for all times.
China has as soon as once more grow to be extra ideological. The affect of the Communist Celebration is on the rise on political and safety points at house and in its neighbourhood. Beijing is ever extra assertive, even coercive. Economically, it's flouting the worldwide guidelines and practices. All of this isn't excellent news, frankly.
However it turns into clear probably the most strategic future relationship of our time is the one between the U.S. and China. It is decisive for the entire world. Europe's curiosity right here is to not enter into an ever extra harmful spiral of battle between the 2 powers, between the 2 superpowers.
With no exit or with none offramp, the best way ahead, I imagine, is for the U.S. and the European Union to staff as much as face China collectively from a place of power, to comprise it the place wanted in safety points, for instance, but additionally to cooperate with Beijing, the place we'd like China's contribution to deal with local weather change or to deal with international well being points.
The U.S. and the European Union have made some headway. They created a joint European, U.S. Commerce and Expertise Council to coordinate our public insurance policies in relation to China. However we'd like a extra complete strategy, a joint strategy to calibrate our China relationship correctly between cooperation and battle. And that's one, if not a very powerful, problem for our alliance within the coming decade, I imagine.
MICHAEL MORELL: Peter, thanks a lot for becoming a member of us. It has been an extremely considerate dialog. It has been a pleasure to have you ever on Intelligence Issues. Thanks a lot.
PETER WITTIG: Michael, it was my pleasure. Thanks.