On this episode of Intelligence Issues, host Michael Morell speaks with Bonnie Glaser, director of the Asia program on the German Marshall Fund of the US, concerning the historical past of Taiwan, present political perceptions of it inside China and the Communist Social gathering, and whether or not Chinese language president Xi Jinping has a timeline for reaching reunification. Morell and Glaser additionally focus on Xi's doubtless perceptions of the Russia-Ukraine disaster and of the impact of the US' longstanding coverage of strategic ambiguity.
HIGHLIGHTS:
- View on Chinese language management: "I believe for any Chinese language chief and for the social gathering itself, Taiwan is a legitimacy situation. If the Communist Social gathering doesn't arise for its sovereignty and the territorial integrity situation, if it have been to not reply successfully if Taiwan declared independence, if different international locations acknowledge Taiwan as impartial - essential international locations, not simply small island states - then doubtlessly the Chinese language Communist Social gathering might come beneath a substantial amount of criticism."
- U.S.-Taiwan relationship: "I believe that the attitudes in in Taiwan in the direction of the US have not modified very a lot. That's, they worth the connection. They need to proceed to maintain it. They wish to maintain the U.S. as shut as doable. Most individuals in Taiwan suppose that the US, I believe, would assist Taiwan if there's a disaster. However there is not any confidence that the US would full bore move massive scale forces to Taiwan and defend it. There's some individuals who maintain that view, however there's at all times been doubts. And when the US demonstrates that it would not have resolve in different elements of the world - similar to when, for instance, Obama drew a purple line in Syria after which didn't comply with via - I believe folks in Taiwan ask themselves, 'Effectively, we, Taiwan do not also have a dedication from the US, so what does that imply for us?'"
- Xi's calculus: "Xi Jinping's precedence is to stop Taiwan independence, and he's assured he can try this at present. The toolkit that China has to make use of to coerce Taiwan is big. It is diplomatic. It's financial. It is navy. It is cyber disinformation. It is fairly vital. So the query is, once more, what are the circumstances during which Xi Jinping would use power? And he may lose confidence sooner or later that reunification may very well be achieved peacefully. He may see that there's a possibility and that the dangers are low; he might miscalculate. That is additionally doable."
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INTELLIGENCE MATTERS - BONNIE GLASER
PRODUCER: Olivia Gazis
MICHAEL MORELL: Bonnie, welcome to Intelligence Issues. It is an honor to have you ever with us.
BONNIE GLASER: And it is a privilege to be your visitor, Michael.
MICHAEL MORELL: So tons to speak about. I actually need to unpack the Taiwan situation with you. We've got not executed that earlier than on Intelligence Issues, and I am excited to do this.
However shortly, earlier than we dig into that, I would like to ask you ways you got here to review Asia and China and the way you got here to dedicate your life's work to it.
BONNIE GLASER: Effectively, I began finding out Asia once I was in school. In reality, I designed my very own main in a political science division, though I began at Oberlin, ended up at Boston College and I did a deep dive into - as a lot as an undergraduate can do - into China as a case examine in modernization.
I studied Chinese language just a few summers in Middlebury Faculty, the place they've an intensive language coaching faculty, after which I went to Taiwan in 1979. I arrived there three weeks after the US broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan. It was a bit tense on the time. It was an actual transition for the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
After which did not pay all that a lot consideration to Taiwan for a few many years till we had the 1995-96 disaster. And I've been to Taiwan yearly since then, most likely a number of instances up till COVID, so have not been there for 2 years.
However I studied China in graduate faculty as nicely. And I might say, the primary 10 years of my profession, I centered extra on China itself and its international coverage and decision-making and debates about its international coverage. I used to be there visiting within the early 80s and U.S.-China-Soviet Triangle was what I used to be specializing in on the time. However within the final 10 years, I have been much more all in favour of how the world views China than how China views the world. Not shocking.
MICHAEL MORELL: Proper, proper. It is modified quite a bit. So, what was it about Asia and China that drew you, do you suppose?
BONNIE GLASER: I believe I used to be on the lookout for one thing that was extraordinarily completely different from the West, I used to be drawn to finding out the language, that was actually difficult, and the tradition and the historical past appeared - simply, it was a draw to me. And I am glad I did. I've watched China in Asia evolve of their significance to the US, and it is it is by no means gotten boring.
MICHAEL MORELL: So, Bonnie, Taiwan. Let's begin with historical past. I believe that is at all times the most effective place to begin. Are you able to inform us type of the brief story of how we bought to the place we're at present?
BONNIE GLASER: Effectively, Taiwan was a Japanese colony from 1895 to August of 1945, and when Japan surrendered on the finish of World Struggle II, Taiwan's standing was left unsure. The KMT, or nationalist social gathering, was preventing the communists in China. And once they have been defeated in 1949, they retreated to Taiwan.
And that is the place the historical past begins to diverge slightly bit within the interpretations of what Taiwan's standing is. So China's place is that Taiwan was returned to China on what's referred to as Retrocession Day in October of 1945. However Taiwan has a unique interpretation and in reality, the KMT has one interpretation, and the opposition social gathering, the DPP, has a unique interpretation.
So the KMT principally shares the Individuals's Republic of China's interpretation. But it surely underscores that Taiwan was the truth is returned to the Republic of China in 1945. And so to at the present time, the social gathering holds that there is one China; Taiwan is a part of China, which can be Beijing's place. However the KMT underscores that China is the Republic of China, not the Individuals's Republic of China.
DPP stance is completely different. That was formally put ahead in 1999 and the decision on Taiwan's future. And it states that Taiwan is a sovereign and impartial state, and any modifications to that standing should be executed via a well-liked vote.
America says that Taiwan's standing remains to be unsettled, and so it doesn't acknowledge Taiwan's declare to be an impartial, sovereign state. It would not acknowledge China's One-China precept, which in its full assertion is there's one China on the planet, Taiwan is a part of China, the federal government of the PRC is the only authorized authorities representing the entire of China. And so the US principally says we simply do not know if Taiwan is sovereign or not, and that is still to be decided.
MICHAEL MORELL: Bonnie, are you able to shed a bit about how sturdy is the view in China that Taiwan belongs to it? Among the many management, the elite, unusual Chinese language? Are there any variations of opinion inside China on Taiwan? How salient a political situation is Taiwan in China? How salient is it throughout the inside politics of the Communist Social gathering? Are you able to type of parse that for us?
BONNIE GLASER: Positive. For a few years, I doubted that Taiwan was an important situation for China, when it comes to its public consideration to the difficulty. It has definitely at all times been essential to the elite, and each Chinese language chief has stated that reunification is an inevitability.
And Jiang Zemin, when he was the final secretary of the Chinese language Communist Social gathering, even tried to set a deadline for the unification of Taiwan with China. However I at all times had the sense that it wasn't that essential to the general public, however that modified. And I believe it was gradual, however significantly beneath Xi Jinping stoking nationalism, paying extra consideration to the significance of sovereignty and safety, and bringing again the territories that China claims - so, consideration to the South China Sea, in fact, the Indian border, the territories which can be the islands which can be disputed with Japan. However significantly Taiwan, as a result of the Chinese language, they educate their folks about this century of nationwide humiliation, which started in the course of the nineteenth century with the Opium Wars.
And so they say, 'That is the final piece that has not been reunified, reintegrated into the Individuals's Republic of China.' So, significantly after Hong Kong has now been, in fact, reabsorbed in 1997, however in recent times develop into, let's assume, much less separate from China and extra similar to some other Chinese language metropolis, Taiwan is the final piece of eradicating that humiliation that the social gathering faces.
And I believe for any Chinese language chief and for the social gathering itself, Taiwan is a legitimacy situation. If the Communist Social gathering doesn't arise for its sovereignty and the territorial integrity situation, if it have been to not reply successfully if Taiwan declared independence, if different international locations acknowledge Taiwan as impartial - essential international locations, not simply small island states - then doubtlessly the Chinese language Communist Social gathering might come beneath a substantial amount of criticism.
However I've to caveat not less than the general public opinion by saying that there actually is not good polling in China about public views. And once I've been in China and speak with particular person students who most likely are typically extra liberal, a few of the youthful students - I've truly heard students say, "Effectively, ultimately, even when Taiwan is not reintegrated into China, it's not the best precedence for China," that it would not need to occur sooner. It may possibly occur later. However I believe there's a sense that ultimately Taiwan has to return to what they name the motherland.
MICHAEL MORELL: So we talked slightly bit concerning the completely different views in Taiwan between the 2 political events. The place does the general public stand on the difficulty and the way has that developed over time?
BONNIE GLASER: Effectively, the attitudes of Taiwan's public towards reunification in not less than a method have been constant for greater than 20 years. Nearly all of the folks in Taiwan need to keep the established order, not less than in the intervening time. There are very small percentages of individuals - and there are superb public opinion polls in Taiwan; they ask the identical questions yearly. And at present, those that assist reunification as quickly as doable is now simply over one p.c - very tiny.
However should you return to the early 90s, it was about 4 p.c. So it hasn't modified all that a lot.
However those that assist sustaining the established order, both simply in the intervening time or indefinitely, is 87 p.c. Why is that this? As a result of the folks in Taiwan know that in the event that they declare independence that China's prone to assault, they are not sure that the US will come to Taiwan's protection. They do not know if their very own nation can ship off an assault from the Individuals's Liberation Military. So that they're actually very sensible.
And in reality, I might say if there is a candidate that runs for president - which, the subsequent elections in Taiwan will likely be January 2024, I believe that the overwhelming majority of individuals in Taiwan wouldn't danger voting for a candidate if that candidate stated, as a part of his or her platform, "If I'm elected, I'll make Taiwan impartial. I'll declare independence so we'll develop into, in a authorized sense, de jure impartial."
However what has actually modified in Taiwan is, once they ask the query in these polls - you've a selection of claiming, the respondent can select between independence as quickly as doable or independence ultimately. And should you mix these numbers, that is now 31 p.c of people that say, "Yeah, ultimately I wish to Taiwan to be an impartial nation." In order that quantity has actually been rising.
The quantity of people that assist a proportion, who assist reunification both instantly or sooner or later remains to be about 5 p.c. It's extremely low.
BONNIE GLASER: So Bonnie, you talked about Hong Kong earlier, and I am questioning if what occurred in Hong Kong over the previous few years has had an affect in Taiwan, both politically or when it comes to public opinion.
BONNIE GLASER: Sure. Effectively, I believe it had a significant affect, although, it's true that China's mannequin for reintegrating Taiwan into China, which is known as One Nation, Two Methods - all of us consider that because the mannequin for Hong Kong. But it surely was truly developed for Taiwan.
And for a few years, polls in Taiwan confirmed that the folks don't assist the applying of One Nation, Two Methods to Taiwan.
So that's actually, I believe, an important factor that affected the attitudes of individuals in Taiwan. It was watching China renege on its guarantees to Hong Kong that it was now not going to permit the folks freedoms. It has basically taken away many of the media freedom. After all, persons are not allowed to protest. There have been clearly many individuals who've now been arrested and imprisoned.
And I believe the folks of Taiwan checked out that final result and stated, "Wow, this isn't a rustic we need to be a part of." And if China have been very open and liberal and democratic, I personally consider the attitudes in Taiwan could be fairly completely different.
BONNIE GLASER: Bonnie, the Taiwanese relations with the US. Are you able to speak slightly bit about Taiwan's view of the US, the significance of the connection. You talked about doubts about whether or not the US would come to their support if the Chinese language attacked. Are you able to discuss possibly how that view has modified over time? Are you able to type of unpack all of that for us?
BONNIE GLASER: For Taiwan, the US is their most essential companion on the planet. America, in fact, is the one nation that can promote weapons to Taiwan. The U.S. had a mutual protection treaty with Taiwan from 1954 to 1979, and even when the U.S. normalized relations with the PRC in 1979, it in a short time created the Taiwan Relations Act, which set out the parameters and procedures and the institutional mechanisms that will be used to handle and maintain the very shut relationship between the US and Taiwan.
And I believe it actually has stood the check of time. It has been, maybe, reinterpreted in some methods because the scenario has modified. America, although we are saying we've a One China coverage, nonetheless, that has been fudged to some extent as China's risk to Taiwan has grown. America has, I believe, developed, for instance, extra nearer protection ties with Taiwan.
We often see leaks or learn studies about how there's American navy officers coaching in Taiwan. Typically there have been joint workout routines, definitely info sharing. In order that, I believe, has been very constant, however it has actually expanded within the, I believe, protection and safety space.
And the growth, I believe, actually took off after the 1995-96 disaster, the place the US realized that we simply did not know very a lot about Taiwan's navy. We did not have sufficient direct dialogue with them.
And on the time, Kurt Campbell was the deputy assistant secretary of protection. And he stated, "We have to have a dialogue with Taiwan," and he established what got here to be often known as the Monterey talks, which don't embody simply the navy, but additionally have representatives from different departments from the U.S. and Taiwan.
They used to do simulations, and that will assist them to attempt to perceive the place they have been misreading one another or what the expectations are of Taiwan in a disaster.
However I believe that the attitudes in in Taiwan in the direction of the US have not modified very a lot. That's, they worth the connection. They need to proceed to maintain it. They wish to maintain the U.S. as shut as doable. Most individuals in Taiwan suppose that the US, I believe, would assist Taiwan if there's a disaster. However there is not any confidence that the US would full bore move massive scale forces to Taiwan and defend it. There's some individuals who maintain that view, however there's at all times been doubts.
And when the US demonstrates that it would not have resolve in different elements of the world - similar to when, for instance, Obama drew a purple line in Syria after which didn't comply with via - I believe folks in Taiwan ask themselves, "Effectively, we, Taiwan do not also have a dedication from the US, so what does that imply for us?"
BONNIE GLASER: So Bonnie, I need to swap from the views in each international locations towards one another to coverage. And I am questioning what your sense is of China's technique for bringing Taiwan again into the fold. What's that? And as a part of that, what's your sense on the view that we hear typically that Xi Jinping has a timeline for reunification
MICHAEL MORELL: For Beijing, Taiwan is before everything a political downside left over from the Civil Struggle. So I like to explain it as a political downside with a navy element, moderately than the reverse.
I believe it is in China's curiosity to attain unification with out bloodshed, if doable. No chief, together with Xi Jinping, would hand over the choice of utilizing power. However I nonetheless consider that that is a final resort.
China's technique is geared toward inducing a way of despair among the many Taiwanese folks, in order that they ultimately conclude that their solely viable future is to hitch the mainland.
So, what we have seen not too long ago and I believe, you realize, debates and discussions about Taiwan have emphasised the navy risk to Taiwan, and it has grown enormously. And we heard Admiral Davidson, who was beforehand the commander of Indo-Pacific Command, say in testimony to Congress final yr that China might use power by 2027, he stated, within the subsequent six years.
And my understanding is that that assertion was based totally on an evaluation of PLA capabilities. A couple of months later, our chairman of the Joint Chiefs stated one thing completely different. Basic Milley stated, "Effectively, we've to have a look at capabilities and intent." And he stated at present, "China doesn't essentially have the intent to invade now."
So there there is a debate, I believe, locally about whether or not Xi Jinping has given up on utilizing coercion and in addition financial enticements to unification. There's additionally debate as to what Xi Jinping's danger profit calculus is. For my part, Xi Jinping sees the dangers as fairly excessive now. This yr, Xi Jinping goes to get his third five-year time period in workplace within the fall of the twentieth Social gathering Congress. So he is definitely not going to take dangers this yr. We are able to discuss later if you would like, whether or not there's some reference to Ukraine, as many individuals consider there's, however the dangers are excessive.
I will simply tick off what I see because the dangers. The PLA may be defeated. A good portion of its navy and air power might be destroyed. China could be risking an all out struggle with the US. There will surely be implications for Chinese language Communist Social gathering legitimacy and home assist if China misplaced that struggle, in the event that they demonstrated they could not defend the territorial integrity of the nation.
I believe that Xi Jinping would set again progress towards extra essential targets for China. And an important purpose, in fact, is nationwide rejuvenation, which requires competing efficiently in superior know-how. And an assault on Taiwan might end result within the formation of a a lot firmer anti-China coalition than we see at present, with a willingness to stop that know-how from going to China.
So I believe for all these causes, the dangers are fairly excessive. And Xi Jinping's precedence is to stop Taiwan independence, and he's assured he can try this at present. The toolkit that China has to make use of to coerce Taiwan is big. It is diplomatic. It's financial. It is navy. It is cyber disinformation. It is fairly vital.
So the query is, once more, what are the circumstances during which Xi Jinping would use power? And he may t lose confidence sooner or later that reunification may very well be achieved peacefully. He may see that there's a possibility and that the dangers are low; he might miscalculate. That is additionally doable.
I additionally wished to only remark in your query about whether or not there's a deadline. I believe we've to acknowledge that on the nineteenth social gathering Congress, Xi Jinping did say one thing completely different than prior Chinese language leaders had stated. He stated reunification is a requirement for nationwide rejuvenation, and the goal date for nationwide rejuvenation is 2049.
So we all know that is the Chinese language dream. However I nonetheless suppose that, you realize, Xi Jinping most likely will not be the chief of China in 2049. I believe he'd be 96 years outdated. So actuarial tables, proper? In all probability will not be chief. One other chief and even Xi Jinping himself might modify that assertion, so I do not see it as a tough and quick deadline, however he has not less than linked the 2 collectively in a means that is worrisome.
MICHAEL MORELL: So that you talked about, Bonnie, simply now the affect of Ukraine on the Taiwan situation. How do you consider that?'
BONNIE GLASER: Effectively, China is undoubtedly watching very carefully the scenario unfolding with Russia and Ukraine. And I believe it's significantly within the responses of the NATO alliance. China will assess its cohesion and the place weaknesses might lie, that may be exploited. So if the U.S. and its allies can put together punishing sanctions for use within the occasion of aggression, nicely, which may sign the desire and skill to do the identical within the occasion of a Chinese language assault on Taiwan.
Now, Beijing may doubtlessly draw conclusions about U.S. resolve, based mostly on the actual fact, not less than at present, the place President Biden has stated that he will not ship troops into Ukraine.
However I believe that the Chinese language know that for the US, Taiwan is extra essential than Ukraine. American pursuits in Taiwan run far deeper. They've a lot stronger roots. As we have mentioned, the U.S., even after breaking the diplomatic relationship with Taiwan, helped Taiwan remodel from a poor navy dictatorship right into a affluent liberal democracy, and that democracy stands at present as a compelling different to China's autocratic system.
There's statistics we might discuss. Taiwan is America's ninth largest buying and selling companion. We all know that it dominates the foundry operations for semiconductors. Everyone seems to be speaking about Taiwan Semiconductor, TSMC. Taiwan's, I believe, location is extra strategic than Ukraine. It sits in the course of the primary island chain.
And most significantly, for Japan, Taiwan is existential. And if the U.S. have been unwilling or unable to defend Taiwan, I believe that that will have enormous penalties for Japanese confidence in U.S. resolve to defend Japan. And I believe China is aware of all of that.
So I do not suppose that the Chinese language will conclude that if the US doesn't use troops and navy property to come back to the protection of Ukraine and stop Russia from taking on that, that will make China's takeover of Taiwan a cakewalk. I do not suppose that is the way in which they see it.
MICHAEL MORELL: So Bonnie, I could not agree with you extra on every thing you stated about how the Chinese language take into consideration Taiwan and beneath what circumstances they might go to struggle and the prices they might pay. I agree with all of that.
So on condition that, I am questioning you probably have a way of what is behind all the current Chinese language navy maneuvers vis a vis Taiwan? Is it merely getting their constructing their navy capabilities? Or is it that plus sending sending messages to Taiwan and to the US? How do you consider all that?
BONNIE GLASER: Effectively yo've already hit on a few of the causes, Michael, I believe that coaching is essential. I hear from folks within the PLA that Xi Kinping has underscored the necessity to practice realistically and sending their air power round Taiwan circumnavigating the island, conducting extra lifelike naval workout routines. Coaching is certainly part of it.
Secondly, I believe they need to stoke nationalism throughout the public, unify the social gathering, display to their those that the Chinese language Communist Social gathering is resolved to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
After which thirdly, I believe China clearly needs to warn each the DPP-led authorities in Taiwan and the US to not cross Chinese language purple strains and deter them from going too far down the highway in the direction of Taiwan changing into impartial.
And so they at all times warn the US to not embolden Taiwan's chief to pursue independence - and I will point out a few what I see as these purple strains.
The precise declaration of independence is definitely a purple line. But when Taiwan have been to carry a referendum on Taiwan's standing - Chen Shui-bian held a referendum when he was president within the early 2000s, and that basically provoked sturdy responses from China. In order that's an instance of, I believe, crossing China's purple strains.
Or, you realize, allowing the US to deploy large-scale forces on Taiwan, I believe, can be a purple line.
However the final purpose that China has, I believe, is probably an important. It takes me again to one thing I talked about earlier; that this coercion, this strain on Taiwan, is a part of a long term Chinese language technique to induce this type of despair inside Taiwan that they actually ought to simply concede to Beijing, unify with Mainland China, that they need to not less than start political talks and attempt to negotiate an final result the place Taiwan can retain a few of the freedoms that it that it has and never need to be confronted with a navy takeover.
However I believe that to this point, not less than, China's navy strain and its different types of strain have actually had a most likely a opposite end result. It has been counterproductive for China, and the Chinese language might ultimately see that, and that might cause them to undertake a harsher technique, possibly even to make use of power or maybe go within the different path and conclude that they should use considerably of a softer hand. Xi Jinping is unlikely to attract that conclusion.
MICHAEL MORELL: Bonnie, how do you suppose the Chinese language take into consideration the debates that happen in American suppose tanks about our China coverage and our Taiwan coverage? , I am pondering particularly of the arguments that we must always finish the One China coverage, acknowledge Taiwan once more, or we must always change our coverage of strategic ambiguity when it comes to the circumstances beneath which we might defend Taiwan, and we must always simply come proper out and say we'll be there for them.
How do you suppose the Chinese language learn all of that? Do you suppose they perceive that as chatter within the suppose tank neighborhood? Or do you suppose they consider that extra critically?
BONNIE GLASER: Effectively, the talk over whether or not the US ought to abandon its coverage of strategic ambiguity and undertake strategic readability, and that will imply a place the place the president would say, "Beneath all circumstances and contingencies, the US will come to Taiwan's protection," which, the US once more has not had that obligation or had a transparent coverage on that since 1979.
The Chinese language are alarmed by that debate. When it first began just a few years in the past and was made fairly well-liked by the article that Richard Haass revealed in Overseas Affairs with David Sachs and the Chinese language that I used to be chatting with on the time wished to grasp what that meant, whether or not it was prone to occur and whether or not there was assist throughout the administration.
I recall at one level, possibly much more than as soon as, our coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs within the Biden administration, Kurt Campbell, did say fairly clearly that this was not one thing that will be in U.S. pursuits. He did not go into nice element, however my sense is that it is not being thought of in any respect by the Biden administration.
However that has not reassured the Chinese language. And one of many predominant causes is that there are various members of Congress that proceed to push for adopting a place of strategic readability.
The Chinese language have a really clear reminiscence for previous historic occasions, and when Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui wished to go to the US and the US advised China that they actually weren't going to offer President Lee Teng-hui a visa. However there was numerous strain from Congress to take action, and on the finish of the day, the U.S. caved in, allowed Lee Teng-hui to come back. He went to his alma mater, Cornell College, and that speech within the aftermath led to the 1995-96 disaster the place China was firing missiles towards Taiwan.
And the Clinton administration ended up dispatching two plane carriers to the area round Taiwan as a way to sign China that it was not going to tolerate this type of coercion towards Taiwan. So China remembers all that, and it concluded we might not need to see this modification.
One other factor that I believe myself could be a harmful final result if we adopted strategic readability is that the Chinese language consider that this was a part of the understanding that Nixon had with Mao, that Taiwan could be put aside. It could be handled in a means that the US wouldn't deploy troops in Taiwan. It could break its treaty with Taiwan, and its relationship with Taiwan would basically be unofficial.
Now at present, China believes the US has extra than simply an official relationship with Taiwan, however the U.S. has caught to these actually core commitments. And I believe that returning to a place of strategic readability may very well be interpreted by Beijing as an abandonment of our obligations and our commitments that we made as a part of normalization. And China might find yourself concluding that it has no selection however to reply forcefully.
And since we're in a second the place China has a standard benefit over Taiwan - and there are many folks within the protection neighborhood who suppose that this window of alternative, although China might find yourself shedding, however it might consider that it'd the truth is be capable to take Taiwan - that this might final a decade if the US goes to struggle at present, or 5, even 10 years, it should go to struggle with the weapons it has at present.
We'd have completely different operational ideas that permits us to be maybe simpler at defending Taiwan than at present, but when we push Xi Jinping right into a nook and we are saying, "We've got deserted our understandings of normalization and we're going to defend Taiwan it doesn't matter what, "I believe there is a greater risk that Xi Jinping would assault.
So I believe it is a dangerous concept, and I believe that the Chinese language consider that it could actually ship this relationship right into a tailspin and maybe trigger them to really feel they don't have any selection however to go to struggle.
MICHAEL MORELL: Bonnie, thanks a lot for becoming a member of us. Fascinating dialogue. We'll get you again sooner or later sooner or later to speak concerning the altering view of China on the planet. I would love to do this, however thanks a lot for becoming a member of us at present. It has been an actual pleasure.
BONNIE GLASER: Thanks for having me.